

Lecture 1

**Info-Gap Theory:  
Overview and Examples**

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# 1 *Highlights*

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§ **What is an info-gap? (Uncertainty is unbounded)**

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§ **Examples**

## **2** *Info-Gap Uncertainty: Examples*

*~~Thames Flood Barrier~~*

Figure 1: 1953 barrier breach.      Figure 2: Barrier element.

**§ Some facts:**

- 1953: worst storm surge of century.
- Flood defences breached.
- 307 dead. Thousands evacuated.
- Canvey Island in Estuary devastated.
- Current barrier opened May 1984.

## § Thames 2100:

Major re-design of flood defences.

## § Uncertainties:

- **Statistics** of surge height:
  - Fairly complete: most years since 1819.
  - Planning for 1000-year surge.
- **Global warming:** sea level rise.
- **Tectonic settling** of s. England.
- **Damage vs flood depth.**
- **Human action:** dredging, embanking.
- **Urban development.**

§ **Severe Knightian uncertainties:** Gaps in knowledge, understanding and goals.

*~~Fukushima Nuclear Reactor~~*

Figure 3: Sea wall breach.

Figure 4: Hydrogen explosion.

**§ Some facts:**

- 11.3.2011: Richter-9 earthquake in NE Japan.
- Tsunami followed shortly.
- Sea wall breached: fig. 3.<sup>‡</sup>
- Hydrogen explosion several days later. Fig. 4.<sup>‡</sup>
- Slow disaster recovery.

**§ Info-gaps:**

- Sub-system interactions.
- Institutional constraints.


*~~Managing Mobile Wireless Network~~*

Figure 5: Mobile wireless network.  
**Red: talk. Blue: motion.**

- Manage resources.
- Info-gaps:
  - Node number, motion, transmission.
  - Barriers.
  - Cross talk.

*~~Climate Change~~*§ **The issue:**

Sustained rise in **green house gases**

results in **temperature rise**

which results in **adverse economic impact.**

§ **Models:**

- Temperature change:  $\Delta\text{CO}_2 \implies \Delta T$ .
- Economic impact:  $\Delta T \implies \Delta\text{GDP}$ .

§ **The problems:**

- **Models** highly uncertain.
- **Data** controversial.

§ E.g., IPCC model for

## Uncertainty in Equil'm Clim. Sensi'ty, $S$ .

- Likely range:  $1.5^{\circ}\text{C}$  to  $4.5^{\circ}\text{C}$ .
- Extreme values highly uncertain.
- 95th quantile of  $S$  in 10 studies:  
Mean:  $7.1^{\circ}\text{C}$ . St. Dev:  $2.8^{\circ}\text{C}$ .




Figure 6: IPCC ch.10, p.799.

*Summary*

§ **Severe Knightian uncertainties:** Gaps in knowledge, understanding and goals.

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§ **Info-Gap models of uncertainty:**

- Disparity between what is known and what **needs to be known** for responsible decision.

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~~*Summary*~~

§ **Severe Knightian uncertainties:** Gaps in knowledge, understanding and goals.

§ **Info-Gap models of uncertainty:**

- Disparity between what is known and what **needs to be known** for responsible decision.
- **Unbounded family of sets** of events (points, functions or sets).
- **No known worst case.**
- No funcs. of probability, plausibility, likelihood, etc.
- **Hybrid: info-gap model of probabilities.**

### **3** *Principle of Indifference*

§ **Question:** Is ignorance probabilistic?

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The probabilistic domain of discourse  
does not encompass all epistemic uncertainty.

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§ **The info-gap contention:**

The probabilistic domain of discourse  
does not encompass all epistemic uncertainty.

§ **We will consider common misuses of probability.**

### 3.1 *Keynes' Example*

§  $\rho =$  specific gravity [ $\text{g}/\text{cm}^3$ ] is **unknown**:

$$1 \leq \rho \leq 3$$


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
§ **Principle of indifference**:

Uniform distribution in  $[1, 3]$ , so:



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$$\mathbf{Prob} \left( \frac{3}{2} \leq \rho \leq 3 \right) = \frac{3}{4}$$



§  $\phi =$  specific volume [ $\text{cm}^3/\text{g}$ ] is **unknown**:

$$\frac{1}{3} \leq \phi \leq 1$$


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
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## § Principle of indifference:

Uniform distribution in  $[\frac{1}{3}, 1]$ , so:

$$\mathbf{Prob} \left( \frac{1}{3} \leq \phi \leq \frac{2}{3} \right) = \frac{1}{2}$$



§ These two events are identical:

$$\underbrace{\left(\frac{1}{3} \leq \phi \leq \frac{2}{3}\right)}_{\text{Specific volume}} \equiv \underbrace{\left(\frac{3}{2} \leq \rho \leq 3\right)}_{\text{Specific gravity}} \quad (1)$$

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§ These two events are identical:

$$\underbrace{\left(\frac{1}{3} \leq \phi \leq \frac{2}{3}\right)}_{\text{Specific volume}} \equiv \underbrace{\left(\frac{3}{2} \leq \rho \leq 3\right)}_{\text{Specific gravity}} \quad (2)$$

§ Hence their probabilities are equal:

$$\underbrace{\mathbf{Prob}\left(\frac{1}{3} \leq \phi \leq \frac{2}{3}\right)}_{\text{Specific volume}} = \underbrace{\mathbf{Prob}\left(\frac{3}{2} \leq \rho \leq 3\right)}_{\text{Specific gravity}} \quad (3)$$

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§ Hence:  $\frac{1}{2} = \frac{3}{4}$

$$\frac{1}{2} = \underbrace{\mathbf{Prob}\left(\frac{1}{3} \leq \phi \leq \frac{2}{3}\right)}_{\text{Specific volume}} = \underbrace{\mathbf{Prob}\left(\frac{3}{2} \leq \rho \leq 3\right)}_{\text{Specific gravity}} = \frac{3}{4}$$

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§ These two events are identical:

$$\underbrace{\left(\frac{1}{3} \leq \phi \leq \frac{2}{3}\right)}_{\text{Specific volume}} \equiv \underbrace{\left(\frac{3}{2} \leq \rho \leq 3\right)}_{\text{Specific gravity}} \quad (6)$$

§ Hence their probabilities are equal:

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§ **The Culprit:** Principle of indifference.

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§ Hence their probabilities are equal:

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§ **The Culprit:** Principle of indifference.

§ Ignorance is **not probabilistic**. It's an **info-gap**.

## 3.2 2-Envelope Riddle

### § The riddle:

- You are presented with two envelopes.
  - Each contains a positive sum of money.
  - One contains twice the contents of the other.
- You **choose an envelope**, open it, and find \$ 50.
- **Would you like to switch envelopes?**

§ **You reason** as follows:

- Other envelope contains either \$ 25 or \$ 100.
- **Principle of indifference:**
- Assume equal probabilities.

The expected value upon switching is:

$$\text{E.V.} = \frac{1}{2} \$ 25 + \frac{1}{2} \$ 100 = \$ 62.50.$$

$$\$ 62.50 > \$ 50.$$

- Yes! **Let's switch**, you say.

## § The riddle, re-visited:

- You are presented with two envelopes.
  - Each contains a positive sum of money.
  - One contains twice the contents of the other.
- You **choose an envelope**, but do not open it.
- **Would you like to switch envelopes?**

§ You reason as follows:

- This envelope contains  $\$ X > \$ 0$ .
- Other envelope contains either  $\$ 2X$  or  $\$ \frac{1}{2}X$ .
- **Principle of indifference:**
- Assume equal probabilities.

The expected value upon switching is:

$$\text{E.V.} = \frac{1}{2} \$ 2X + \frac{1}{2} \$ \frac{1}{2}X = \$ \left(1 + \frac{1}{4}\right)X > X.$$

- Yes! **Let's switch**, you say.

§ You reason as follows:

- This envelope contains  $\$ X > \$ 0$ .
- Other envelope contains either  $\$ 2X$  or  $\$ \frac{1}{2}X$ .
- **Principle of indifference:**
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The expected value upon switching is:

$$\text{E.V.} = \frac{1}{2} \$ 2X + \frac{1}{2} \$ \frac{1}{2}X = \$ \left(1 + \frac{1}{4}\right)X > X.$$

- Yes! **Let's switch**, you say.

§ You wanna switch again? **And again? And again?**

## 4 *Conclusion*

## In Conclusion

§ **Info-gap uncertainty:**

innovation, discovery, ignorance, surprise.

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§ **Optimism:** our models get better all the time.

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§ **Info-gap uncertainty:**

innovation, discovery, ignorance, surprise.

§ **Info-gap uncertainty is unbounded.**

§ **Optimism:** our models get better all the time.

§ **Realism:** our models are wrong now  
(and we don't know where or how much).

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## In Conclusion

### § Info-gap uncertainty:

innovation, discovery, ignorance, surprise.

### § Info-gap uncertainty is unbounded.

### § Optimism: our models get better all the time.

### § Realism: our models are wrong now

(and we don't know where or how much).

### § Responsible decision making:

- Specify your goals.
- Maximize your robustness to uncertainty.
- Study the trade offs.
- Exploit windfall opportunities.