Decision Making in Defense and Military Affairs: 
An Info-Gap Approach 

Yakov Ben-Haim 
Yitzhak Moda'i Chair in Technology and Economics 
Technion - Israel Institute of Technology 
yakov@technion.ac.il, info-gap.com 

7 February 2017 
Defence Science and Technology Laboratory 
Fareham, Hampshire, U.K. 

Abstract

There is a moral imperative to do one’s best when making high-consequence decisions for defense and security. However, our understanding is often wrong and we are frequently surprised by innovations and events. Using our faulty models in trying to optimize policy outcomes is infeasible, even irresponsible. The practical implication of severe uncertainty is that we must ask: What outcomes are required? What performance is essential? How can we be robust against surprise? We describe the methodology of info-gap decision theory, and consider several examples: the US decision to invade Iraq in 2003, force development planning, and the paradox of optimal monitoring and surveillance.

Selected references in military affairs


General introduction to info-gap theory


Books on info-gap theory and application


More sources: info-gap.com