



# Logic in Action



# Introduction: IDF and Special Operations

- History of the IDF and special operations
- The “Unit”
- Profession: planning
- What can we learn from their experience? What makes it relevant to other domains such as BS, Politics, human projects in general?

# The Logic of Special Ops



R. R. Publisher

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Herald Tribune, February 1, 2016
The age of the commando

Matt Gallagher

A few months ago, my wife and I had dinner with a couple we didn't know very well. It was awkward at first, but there was wine and conversation soon followed. At one point, the wife asked about my tour in Iraq, where I served four years as a cavalry officer. I began talking about the desert, the tribal politics and the day-to-day travails of counterterrorism. "That's all fine," the husband interrupted. "But tell us about the super-soldiers. The Special Operators. That's what people care about."

He had no time for "G.I. Joe." He wanted "American Sniper." He is not alone. The mythos of Special Operations has seduced our country's popular imagination, and has proved to be the one prism through which the public will engage with America's wars. From the box office to bookstores, the Special Ops commando — quiet and professional, stoic and square-jawed — thrives. That he works in the shadows, where missions are classified and enemy combatants come in silhouette of night-vision green, is all the better — details only complicate. We like our heroes sanitized, perhaps especially in

partner countries, a few involve combat. In December, Secretary of Defense Ashton B. Carter announced at a House hearing that an "expeditionary targeting force" will be sent to Iraq to conduct raids on top Islamic State targets. They'll be pulling in roughly 1,500 troops already there working as advisers and trainers. President Obama seemed desperate to strike a balance between doing nothing in the region and not engaging on the hot buttons on the ground" promises.

Clearly, commandos have boots, and those boots touch the ground. But White House officials have taken to what a report in his newspaper recently called "linguistic contortions" to obscure the force's combat roles. As the military as a whole downsizes, Special Ops recruitment continues to rise. There are approximately 70,000 Special Ops personnel today, a number that includes soldiers, civilians, National Guard and Reservists, as well. This number is up from 45,000 in 2011 and 41,000 in 2011. Still, Adm. William H. McRaven — then the head of Special Ops at the Pentagon — told the force has "contracted to 17,000" from the endless deployment cycles. In response, the Army alone last year put out a call for 5,000 new Special Ops candidates. In the political sense, the policy

Special Operations, decisions about missions are not generally put before them for approval. Individual force commanders are overwhelmingly make those calls. While Mr. Obama has proved cautious in authorizing their use, the next commander in chief might not be so prudent. Our way the remote and remote, and Special Ops often function as highly trained kill squads sent out into the beyond in the name of country. They are the best there is at that. But this strategy means a recurring cycle of armed conflict, a decision of such significance that all citizens need to be weighing it, not just a select few.

My own experience with Special Ops is limited. I didn't have many positive encounters with them overseas. As part of the Special Ops training, I spent time in Iraq, my scout platoon and I patrolled a rural town north of Baghdad for 15 months on a counterterrorism mission that often seemed to conflict with that of the operators. In early 2008 we were called to a farm to help kill up the pieces after a commando raid. A tribal leader claimed that

the militia of the Special Ops world, all brute force and power, as memorialized in the film "Black Hawk Down." "We got on the five-year line," a Ranger officer tells a dismissive Delta soldier, "you're going to need my Rangers." The days in Tacoma were spent trying to get the Rangers' public affairs office to approve on-post access. The nights in Tacoma were mostly spent in bars with young Rangers looking to unwind from their last tour while also preparing for the next one. They described the routine: three to six months deployed, three to six months stateside, rinse and repeat. Elizabeth Sanet, who teaches English at West Point, calls these service members "war consumers." More than one observer in Tacoma, including some partners and spouses, termed it an addiction.

If that was true — and it didn't apply to many, in my estimation — that'd have their reasons. A number of Rangers I met joked that vampires saw more light than they did during their deployment. I came to see these young men in a way I hadn't when I'd worn the uniform myself, because of the way they embraced the ordinariness of it all. They weren't fighting for resolution, as we'd be in Iraq, or how we thought we'd been. Peace over there wasn't their goal. Calm back here was.



AS CORPORATE TAX DODGER

Johnson Controls, an industrial and auto parts supplier headquartered in Milwaukee, announced this week that it is selling itself to Tyco International, a maker of fire-fighting products based in Ireland. The deal will let Johnson Controls pass itself off as Irish and, in the process, cut its taxes in the United States by at least \$250 million a year. Johnson Controls is not the first American company to sidestax by merging with a smaller company in a low-tax nation, and it won't be the last.

Johnson Controls is, however, the latest and quite possibly the most brazen tax dodger. The company would exist as it is today but for American taxpayers, who did \$80 billion in 2008 to bail out the auto industry. What's galling about this and similar maneuvers is that Congress has done nothing to stop them. Since 2008, some five dozen American companies have used gaps and loopholes in the law to change their tax nationalities, a process known as "inverting."

Inverted companies keep the benefits of being American, but have a much lower tax bill. They normally keep their headquarters and top executives in the United States. They keep the protections on securities and patents provided by American laws, as well as their contracts and connections with the federal government and its research agencies. Inverted companies are available. One would be to buy investors the use of low capital-gains tax rates when you sell stock in an inverted company, on the sensible ground that the company's reduced tax bill is enough of a perk.

In Congress, critics, consumers and taxpayer-advocacy groups can show disapproval by identifying and publicizing the products made by inverted companies and publicly identifying and publicizing replacement products from less offensive competitors. In addition, advocates of all investing, which applies social as well as financial criteria in selecting investments, could screen out inverted companies. The White House should reform federal factoring rules to make it harder for inverted companies to do business. It also needs to be more vocal in urging Ireland, the Netherlands and other inversion nations for their beggar-thy-neighbor tax policies. Congress is on the wrong side of the inversion issue. There has to come from elsewhere.

OUR BONNES?

Discovery of what looks like the aftermath of a brutal beating between two groups of prehistoric hunter-gatherers in a cave on the African lake is certain to stir up a debate on human nature that goes all the way back to Adam and Eve.

Archaeological creation stories that our forebears were entirely pure and peaceful and only fell into nasty games of dominance with the knowledge of the Eden fruit. A corollary advanced by one school of biologists and anthropologists holds that our Stone Age ancestors were not inherently violent, and, apart from fratricide, did not wage organized war until they decided to coalesce into societies.

So, proclaim proponents of a rival theory that war is a biological roots, and we've been waging it ever since. That's what we are, argues the philosopher Thomas Hobbes; not so, declared Jean-Jacques Rousseau, as scientists found at a place called Nataruk on the western shore of a lagoon on Lake Turkana in Kenya skeletons showing unmistakable evidence of violent — crushed skulls, imbedded arrow or spear points like it. It was obviously a terribly violent encounter, as if war skeletons, alas, do not provide a conclusive answer, remains unacknowledged. War, broadly defined as large-scale clashes, was fairly common between settled societies, and it is not clear whether the dwellers on the land around Lake Turkana at the time of the Nataruk

murky times like these. The age of the commandos, though, is more than pop culture fantasy emanating from Hollywood. It's now a significant part of our military strategy.

Last month the White House announced the nomination of Gen. Joseph L. Votel to lead United States Central Command, which is responsible for military operations in 28 countries in the Middle East and Central Asia, including Iraq, Iran, Yemen, Syria and Saudi Arabia — in other words, the hotbed of our geopolitical conflicts. General Votel has been the head of the military's Special Operations Command since 2014. His Central Command nomination represents a break in tradition that has almost always gone to generals of more conventional backgrounds. Military analysts hailed it as a sign of the Obama administration's trust in, and reliance on, Special Operations.

Special Operations Command, or SOCOM, oversees all Special Operations Forces — our Delta Force operators, Navy SEALs, Green Berets, Army Rangers, among others. Special Operations personnel deployed to approximately 139 nations in 2015 — about 70 percent of the countries on the planet. While a majority of those missions involve training the defense forces of

work. The secrecy surrounding Special Ops keeps the heavy human costs of war off the front pages. But in doing so, it also leaves the nonmilitary public wholly disconnected from the armed violence carried out in our name. It enables our state of perpetual warfare, and assures that as little as we care and understand today, we'll care and understand even less tomorrow.

Special Operations are not a panacea. Just as SEALs' training is not their purpose without everyday beat cops on corners, operators can't land and don't function in a vacuum. Many a military analyst has compared our current "counterterrorism" approach with a Band-Aid — whole effective, but effectiveness has no clear end state. And recent history suggests an overreliance on counterterrorism can lead to tragedy. In 1983, in Somalia, Special Operations seemed a cure-all. Then came the battle of Mogadishu. Same with 1980 and Operation Eagle Claw, as we desperately tried to end the Iran hostage crisis. The former led to a short-lived retreat from international intervention, the latter to the very creation of SOCOM.

Further, like a postmodern Praetorian Guard, our operators don't serve the will of the American people. Though Congress holds the purse strings for

two of his lieutenants had been taken by mistake by "the other Americans, the ones with helicopters." Those other Americans, the tribal leader told me, said that the two Iraqis were brothers, and members of Al Qaeda in Iraq. Now we were left to explain to the men's family why they were gone, why their house had been cycloned, and why a placard of Mecca had been torn from a wall, and receive the hard stares from those men's children as we stood over a dead pet dog that had been shot during the raid.

I didn't tell that story to my dinner companions, though. Instead I talked about a visit I made to Tacoma, Wash., in 2011, when I got to know the other side of these other Americans. I'd left the military and was now a writer, or trying to be one. A college friend and his Ranger unit were returning from Afghanistan, and I had visions of writing a tale of young men constantly at war but in between battles.

The Rangers' Special Ops unit that Pat Tillman left his F.F.I. career in 2002 to join, is a proving ground of aunts and attracts many younger soldiers. Though designed in part as an elite light infantry for airfield seizures, the Rangers have seen their purpose morph: More than ever, kill-or-capture raids are their raison d'être. They're

I didn't agree with that worldview, not at all. But I still appreciated it. On Super Bowl Sunday, my friend and I were invited to watch the game with a group of older sergeants. It seemed that most had already settled into their state-side lives, sharing diaper responsibilities with their wives, swapping war stories with one another.

While the adults watched the game, kids ran around with Nerf guns as big as they were. This was Cowboys and Indians. They were playing "Rangers like Daddy, and none were willing to play the role of an Al Qaeda jihadist, even in pretend.

The baby-faced Ranger privates I helped sneak into bars in 2011 are backed sergeants by now. The sergeants I met are either in charge of entire Ranger companies or have moved into the so-called black units of SOCOM, like Delta Force. They remain anonymous silhouettes to the country they serve, not just because their bosses at the Pentagon want that way, but because we do, too.

The other Americans, indeed.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Turks and Kurds need to talk

rested or tortured or killed, atrocities which are again being committed, it's

the Kurds can lead to a story like Syria's — with global consequences.

Freeman, Whooji Goldberg, Jennifer Hudson, Halle Berry, Mo'Nique, Octavia Spencer and L. Lorraine Newsum.

# Operation Venomous Sting 1994

## חטיפת דיראני

**מכבי חיפה**  
**אלופת המדינה**  
**בכדורגל**  
(ראה מכיפת הספורט)

# ידיעות אחרונות

1.80 ש"ח (מאילוח)	2.10 ש"ח (כולל מע"מ)	יום א', י"ב בכסלו, תשנ"ד 1994.11.22 ליל 23:00 עד 00:00	רובי נלמן יהודה גורן תלמידי	העורך משה רזי	העורך הארצי אריה טווס	העורך הארצי דיראני	ע"ד הכלכלה הראשון גד מנשה	הע"ד לשכר ד"ר ה. רותבליט	Yedioth Ahrenoth ידיעות אחרונות
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בפעולה נועזת על חיילי צה"ל בעומק שטח לבנון נחטף והובא לישראל מוסטבה דיראני, שהחזיק בעבר בנושח העבוי רון ארד • דיראני הופתע במיטתו ולא הספיק להפעיל את אקדחו הטעון

# דיראני לחוקריו הישראליים: מיסרתי את רון חי לאיראנים

שבחים לצה"ל על המבצע, 80 ק"מ מהגבול, שביצעו חיילי יחידה מובחרת מאוד • מחמוות מיוחדות לאגף המודיעין של צה"ל על תכנון החטיפה • אשתו של דיראני התעוררה משנתה ושאלה: "מי זה?" והחייילים ענו: "אנחנו ישראלים" • כוננות בצפון וחשש מירי קטיושות החטוף דיראני - מתכנן פעולות טרור

**רון ארד - למעלה מ-7 שנים בשבי**



**פרשת רון בדישי**

## למה דיראני, למה עכשיו


• למלשתיים, לאיראן ולאנשי החמאס והג'יהאד הירוק - ירו של גדול ארמיה פתח מן השבויים לכסוף את הכף בעי המבצע ורוק הקפאון המימשל כשרשת תנועת הסבי. ככל ידוע הוא מודיעין, שגם נשען למבוי מתום מוחלט אזה מצב ששפת פעולה חיובית שתחולל חומה ונתרון, בחברת תנועת פתח ברחמים הנעצנים לרובי, מתנונת אלה ניתן לה טיט טרור רב (הפרישת המלחה - בעמוד 2)

**החטוף דיראני - מתכנן פעולות טרור**



Planning

Planning to execution, tip of the Iceberg



## Planning

***Now that the plan is clear to all of us and all the moves listed here on the map are known, I want to tell you a few more words; when the battle will issue, nothing on the ground would happen as it is listed in this (battle plan) sketch, the lines and arrows in reality would be completely different, but this should introduce no weakness in you since the battle never develops according to the arrows of the map. One thing though must proceed exactly according to the sketch, and this is the conception and principles laid down in the very foundation of these lines..***

General Tal to his troops in his command before going to battle in the Six Days War, 1967

***You Gringos think that a plan is a list of things..***

A senior Ecuadorian activist to his American colleague in The Save the Amazon, taken from the Documentary "Crude" whose subject is the environmental legal fight with Shell in Ecuador

Planning

***Planning: a list of instructions execution must satisfy?***






# The Art of War

*“Do not repeat the tactics which have gained you one victory, but let your methods be regulated by the infinite variety of circumstances.”*

— Sun Tzu, The Art of War

*“He thought that strategy was not planning in the sense of working through an established list, but rather that it requires quick and appropriate responses to changing conditions.”*




## Planning

- *Wide planning vs. detailed planning?*
- *What is a criteria? What is a standard?*
- *A pre-set answer or a well-phrased question?*
- *Margins in planning, the status of the criteria?*
- *Opss...frame/plane of reference has shifted*
- *Rules of thumb, simplicity in planning*
- *Iron Aims*

The Standard

Straight forward!?




# Straight forward!?

*The Shifting grounds of the Frame of Reference..*

41 | הסטנדרט

כסטנדרט, תלוי, כמובן, במישור הייחוס הרלוונטי. האילוסטרציה הבאה תקל עלינו לעקוב אחר מהלך הקסם של המרצה הצעיר.



תרשים מס' 1. מישור הייחוס

The Standard

# The Standard Metre




## The Standard Metre in Paris

**There is one thing of which one can say neither that it is one metre long, nor that it is not one metre long, and that is the standard metre in Paris.—But this is, of course, not to ascribe any extraordinary property to it, but only to mark its peculiar role in the language-game of measuring with a metre-rule.**

*Wittgenstein, L. (1953) Philosophical Investigations § 50*

The Standard

*Opss...frame of reference has shifted*




## The Polygon of Risks

- *What is the polygon of Risks?*
- *The economy of risks: standards and protections*
- *“High Standards” and the fallacy of (local) optimization*
- *“Internal/private Spares”*
- *Managing risks vs. the timing of forces in battle*
- *“A dialogue with the Mission” - Mission is a segment of the polygon*
- *Who dares wins*




# Polygon of Risks



מבנה עם סיכונים

Polygon of Risks

## A Dialogue bet Trade-Offs



Handwritten text:  $\frac{1}{3} \text{ or } \frac{1}{3} \text{ or } \frac{1}{3}$

Polygon of Risks

## Lebanon, 1982: The Battle of Ras Ziton

*Tradeoff: Protective vest vs. dynamic awareness*




## Polygon of Risks

# Lebanon, 1982: The Battle of Ras Ziton


*Tradeoff: Protective vest vs. dynamic awareness*



# Collapse



# Collapse







# Polygon of Risks

הרי הוא יישאר עם הסיכון, ואני עם הביטחון. אם תצלח דרכנו, מה טוב, סביר שאקבל קרדיט על הזהירות הרבה שהפגנתי. אם ניכשל, אופס, אני מוגן, חברי יזכה לקיתונות


תרשים 2. מצולע הביצוע



2. דיאלוג עם צלעות הביצוע



1. מצולע הביצוע או הסיכונים



3. מצולע הביצוע - ניהול סיכונים דינמי



4. "סטנדרטים נבונים"

תיחוס לו. ככל שמחיר הכישלון, ואיתו החשש והפחד להיות משויך עם כישלון, עולה, כך טיעון תורת המשחקים הזה מקבל כוח ממשי רב, ואיתו עידוד להימנעות מסיכון.

\*\*\*

לא לו מהקוראים האמונים על התחום המתמטי הנקרא תורת המשחקים, ודאי יזכיר מצב העניינים הלוגי - והטרגי

הזה - את "דילמת האסיר" המפורסמת, שבה שני אסירים מתלבטים אם לקחת סיכון, לבטוח איש ברעהו ולסרב יחד להודות כי ביצעו שוד בנק, וכך להסתפק בעונשי מאסר קלים על עברות מזדמנות אחרות, מכיוון שכך אי אפשר להרשיעם בשוד. או להודות ולהפליל כך את חברים

לשוד. במקרה הזה החבר יקבל את מלוא העונש הקבוע בחוק לעברה חמורה זו, אך המלשין, כך מתחייבת המטרה, כפרס על אזרחותו הטובה, יזכה למעמד של עד מדינה וישוחרר לאלתר. אלא שאם שניהם יודו, ייאלצו שניהם לשבת בכלא, שכן איש מהם אינו נדרש כעת כעד מדינה. במקרה הזה הם יקבלו אמנם עונש מאסר

כבד כראוי למעשה השוד שביצעו, אך מופחת ממלוא העונש הקבוע בחוק מכיוון ששיתפו פעולה עם הרשויות והודו. העוקץ בדוגמה הזאת הוא כי אותו טיעון, כשהוא מופעל על ידי שני השודדים,



# “Adam Smith was Wrong”



Polygon of Risks

## The Battle of Saratoga Springs - Arnold Benedict



*Napoleon: mastery in the timing of forces in battle*

*In analogy to dynamic management of risks in the polygon*



# Decisions



- *Decisions and Time*
- *The Singularity of the decision dilemma*
- *The Tennis player and the singular decision point in time*
- *Too early, too late*
- *The resolution of constraints on the time line*

Decisions

## Too Early: A Bridge too Far



# Too Early: A Bridge too Far



IT TOOK 14 SUPERSTARS AND A CAST OF THOUSANDS TO MAKE THIS ONCE-IN-A-LIFETIME FILM!

Joseph E. Levine presents  
**A BRIDGE TOO FAR**  
Screenplay by  
Dirk Bogarde  
James Caan  
Michael Caine  
Sean Connery  
Edward Foy  
Elliott Gould  
Gene Hackman  
Anthony Hopkins  
Hardy Kruger  
Laurence Olivier  
Ryan O'Neal  
Robert Redford  
Maximilian Schell  
Liv Ullmann  
From the book by  
Cornelius Ryan  
Produced by  
William Goldman  
Screenplay by  
John Addlison  
Directed by  
Joseph E. Levine  
Richard P. Levine  
Produced by  
Richard Attenborough  
Colour by  
Maurison  
Dolby Stereo  
Dolby Stereo  
Dolby Stereo

Joseph E. Levine presents  
**A BRIDGE TOO FAR**

A grid of 14 actor portraits from the movie 'A Bridge Too Far'. The portraits are arranged in three rows: the first row has five portraits, the second row has five portraits, and the third row has four portraits. The actors are Dirk Bogarde, James Caan, Michael Caine, Sean Connery, Edward Foy, Elliott Gould, Gene Hackman, Anthony Hopkins, Hardy Kruger, Laurence Olivier, Ryan O'Neal, Robert Redford, Maximilian Schell, Liv Ullmann, and Cornelius Ryan.


Decisions

## A Bridge too Far



Decisions

# A Bridge too Far





Decisions

# Too early, too late, operation Eagle Claw



# Waterloo: *Too late, Too late for all eternity*



BATAILLE DE MONT-SAINT-JEAN, DITE DE WATERLOO. (LE 18 JUIN 1815.)



# Battle at Waterloo

*Too late, Too late for all eternity*

גרושי עוד ישכיל להוביל את כוחותיו ולהוציאם מכיתור של כוחות האויב חזרה למולדת, לצרפת. הוא ימשיך אחר כך גם בקריירה צבאית מרשימה. אבל דבר כבר לא יוכל לשחרר אותו מגזר דינה של ההיסטוריה: "אחרי שניית-הכישלון, מוכיח גרושי - מאוחר מדי - את מלוא כישרונו הצבאי. כל מידותיו הטובות, שיקול דעת, יעילות ואחריות, צפות ועולות בו מחדש כאשר הוא נדרש לסמוך על עצמו ולא עוד על הפקודה הכתובה. מכותר על ידי מחנה, העולה במספרו פי חמש על כוחותיו הוא, מוביל גרושי - השג תכסיסי למופת - את יחידתו חזרה דרך שורות האויב ממש, מבלי לאבד אף חיל ואף תותח, ובמבצע זה הוא מציל לצרפת, מציל לקיסרות, את צבאה האחרון. אולם בהגיעו למולדת אין שם עוד קיסר, שיודה לו, ואין עוד אויב אשר נגדו יוכל להוביל את חייליו. **אכן הגיע מאוחר מדי, מאוחר מדי לתמיד.** אף על פי, שלמראית עין עוד נתונה דרך חייו בסימן של עליה, אף על פי שהוא זוכה להתמנות למצביא עליון ולפאר של צרפת, אף על פי שהוא מצטיין בכל תפקיד, המוטל עליו, אין דבר בעולם העשוי להשיב לו את הרגע האחד, שמינה אותו לשליטו של הגורל - והוא נכשל במבחן זה, כשלון חרוץ.

## **גזר דינה של ההיסטוריה הוא אכן חסר פשרות:**

זוהי נקמתו הנוראה של הרגע הגדול, היורד אך לעתים רחוקות אל חיהם של בני התמותה, באיש הנבחר, שנכשל כי לא עמדו בו כוחותיו לנצלו כראוי. כל המידות הטובות, כגון זהירות צייתנות, שקדנות ומתינות, המסייעות בידי האדם למלא אחר תביעותיו של מהלך החיים היום יומי, הרי הן נמסות אין-אונים בכורו הלוחט של הרגע הגורלי הגדול, הזקוק תמיד אך ורק לגאוניות בצורו את צורתה לדורות הבאים. בבזז הוא דוחה מעליו את ההססן ורק את עז-הנפש מרים הוא בזרועותיו הלוחבות אל רקיעי הגיבורים.

Decisions

# Defeat at Waterloo



# Simulation/Training/Practice/Exercise

- *What is an Exercise?*
- *A ‘repeat’ against cartoon figures*
- *The fallacy of 1:1 simulation - in practice and in planning*
- *Crossing the border - from simulation to real*
- *The Moment of Truth – protected by the protocol or responsible before reality?!*

# Failures

- *The logic of Failure*
- *Mistake as repetition*
- *Repeated success is a failure*
- *After failure: strategy of a responsible “containing” vs. “cleaning”*
- *Who is in a position to judge?*
- *The paradox of ‘the reasonable commander’*

Moment of Truth

if you had one shot, one opportunity..



if you had one shot or one opportunity  
to seize everything you've ever wanted,  
one moment. would you capture it?  
or just let it slip?

## Moment of Truth

There are many ways to go forward but only one way to stand still..





Moment of Truth

# Man on Wire



Moment of Truth

Standing still..



20<sup>th</sup> Century Philosophy

# Special Ops and the philosophy of the 20th century

*The quest for perfectionism and its limits: what to the greatest logician of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and special Ops?*

*Standards and rules: what to the greatest philosopher of 20<sup>th</sup> century and special Ops?*

*What to the length of the standard meter in Paris and the standard of action in special Ops?*


*What to Wittgenstein's "axiom of silence" and the education of paratroopers in the IDF?*

*The call for judgment and the ethical fallacy in in the attempt to tie the combat soldier and commander to a preliminary binding system of rigid rules*

*What is discipline then? Why then we should obey commands, and the principle of translation in following rules*

20<sup>th</sup> Century Philosophy

## Two Figures...



20<sup>th</sup> Century Philosophy

Two (more) Figures...





20<sup>th</sup> Century Philosophy

## Two (more) Figures...




# Ludwig Wittgenstein: Following a Rule



20th century philosophy

## From repetition to extension: The Arrow of Action





Strategy, Logic and Action

Do what's right and leave the consequences to God

*The Danish Quantum Physicist, Niels Bohr, on the logical puzzle hidden in the classical Hollywood Western films featuring a duel between the Good and the Bad*

*Why Ethics and Esthetics are one and what this has to do with the economy of risks*

*Culture of war, the intimate test of war, ethics of battlefield, the hidden understandings and eyes' contact of soldiers, , retroactive judgment*

*The spirit is of joint problem solving*

*Emanuel Kant's Do what's right and leave the consequences to God – and the challenge of the moving target*

# Duel



A warning shot/remark of caution, or, the limits of the model

*The arrogance of the victorious*

*The overwhelming power of resources and  
consequently the illusion of control*

*The fallacy of Quantifying and measuring Ethics*


*Zooming in and losing the big picture, we must  
simultaneously work and operate within the picture as  
a whole*

*Sidney Morgenbesser's cogito: I think therefore you  
are wrong*

*Conclusion: modesty and respect to matter*

Strategy, Logic and Action

Quantifying Ethics and its (grave) consequences..



Strategy, Logic and Action

# Counting the dead..





Strategy, Logic and Action

# False self image as a problem in optimization



# Value vs. Profit: The 2008 crisis



## Conclusion: what have we learned?

- *A rule/standard as a well phrased question*
- *The Polygon of risks - Economy of Risks*
- *Decision and Time*
- *Mistake and Repetition*
- *The Moment of Truth and doing what is right*



# Brothers - what we do in life, echoes in eternity!

