

Lecture 1

Info-Gap Theory: Overview and Examples

Yakov Ben-Haim

Technion

Israel Institute of Technology



Contents

- 1 **Highlights** (paris2023Lec01-001.tex) **3**

- 2 **Info-Gap Uncertainty: Examples** (ig-unc01intro.tex) **6**

- 3 **Principle of Indifference** (indif5a-intro.tex) **17**
 - 3.1 **Keynes' Example**(indif5c-keynes.tex) 23
 - 3.2 **2-Envelope Riddle**(indif5b-envelop.tex) 35

- 4 **Conclusion** (paris2023Lec01-001.tex) **40**

1 *Highlights*

Highlights

§ **What is an info-gap? (Uncertainty is unbounded)**

§

Highlights

§ **What is an info-gap? (Uncertainty is unbounded)**

§ **Examples**

2 *Info-Gap Uncertainty: Examples*

~~Covid-19~~

§ The issue:

- **Severely infectious virus.**
- **Origin:** Late 2019. Chinese research lab?
- **Rapid spread** world-wide.

§

~~Covid-19~~§ **The issue:**

- **Severely infectious virus.**
- **Origin:** Late 2019. Chinese research lab?
- **Rapid spread** world-wide.

§ **Uncertainties** in early 2020:

- **Transmission mechanism: unknown.**
- **Severity: perhaps great.**
- **Treatment: symptomatic only.**
- **Public health policy: lock down.**
- **Economic and social impact: severe.**

§ **Info-gaps** abound!

~~Thames Flood Barrier~~

Figure 1: 1953 barrier breach.

Figure 2: Barrier element.

§ Some facts:

- 1953: worst storm surge of century.
- Flood defences breached.
- 307 dead. Thousands evacuated.
- Canvey Island in Estuary devastated.
- Current barrier opened May 1984.

§ Thames 2100:

Major re-design of flood defences.

§ Uncertainties:

- **Statistics** of surge height:
 - Fairly complete: most years since 1819.
 - Planning for 1000-year surge.
- **Global warming:** sea level rise.
- **Tectonic settling** of s. England.
- **Damage vs flood depth.**
- **Human action:** dredging, embanking.
- **Urban development.**

§ Severe Knightian uncertainties: Gaps in knowledge, understanding and goals.

~~Fukushima Nuclear Reactor~~

Figure 3: Sea wall breach.



Figure 4: Hydrogen explosion.

§ Some facts:

- 11.3.2011: Richter-9 earthquake in NE Japan.
- Tsunami followed shortly.
- Sea wall breached: fig. 3.[‡]
- Hydrogen explosion several days later. Fig. 4.[‡]
- Slow disaster recovery.

§ Info-gaps:

- Sub-system interactions.
- Institutional constraints.

~~ Climate Change ~~§ **The issue:**

Sustained rise in **green house gases**

results in **temperature rise**

which results in **adverse economic impact.**

§ **Models:**

- Temperature change: $\Delta\text{CO}_2 \implies \Delta T$.
- Economic impact: $\Delta T \implies \Delta\text{GDP}$.

§ **The problems:**

- **Models** highly uncertain.
- **Data** controversial.

§ E.g., IPCC model for

Uncertainty in Equil'm Clim. Sensi'ty, S .

- Likely range: 1.5°C to 4.5°C .
- Extreme values highly uncertain.
- 95th quantile of S in 10 studies:
Mean: 7.1°C . St. Dev: 2.8°C .




Figure 5: IPCC ch.10, p.799.

~~*Summary*~~

§ **Deep Knightian uncertainties:** Gaps in knowledge, understanding and goals.

§

~~*Summary*~~

§ **Deep Knightian uncertainties:** Gaps in knowledge, understanding and goals.

§ **Info-Gap models of uncertainty:**

- Disparity between what **is known** and what **needs to be known** for responsible decision.

-

~~*Summary*~~

§ **Deep Knightian uncertainties:** Gaps in knowledge, understanding and goals.

§ **Info-Gap models of uncertainty:**

- Disparity between what **is known** and what **needs to be known** for responsible decision.
- **Unbounded family of sets** of events (points, functions or sets).
- **No known worst case.**
- No functions of probability, plausibility, likelihood, etc.
- Hybrid: info-gap model of probabilities.

3 *Principle of Indifference*

§ **Question:** Is ignorance probabilistic?

§

§ **Question:** Is ignorance probabilistic?

§ **Principle of indifference** (Bayes, LaPlace, Jaynes, ...):

- Elementary events,
about which **nothing is known**,
are assigned **equal probabilities**.

-

§ **Question:** Is ignorance probabilistic?

§ **Principle of indifference** (Bayes, LaPlace, Jaynes, ...):

- Elementary events,
about which **nothing is known**,
are assigned **equal probabilities**.
- Uniform distribution represents **complete ignorance**.

§

§ **Question:** Is ignorance probabilistic?

§ **Principle of indifference** (Bayes, LaPlace, Jaynes, ...):

- Elementary events,
about which **nothing is known**,
are assigned **equal probabilities**.
- Uniform distribution represents **complete ignorance**.

§ The **info-gap contention**:

The probabilistic domain of discourse
does not encompass all epistemic uncertainty.

§

§ **Question:** Is ignorance probabilistic?

§ **Principle of indifference** (Bayes, LaPlace, Jaynes, ...):

- Elementary events,
about which **nothing is known**,
are assigned **equal probabilities**.
- Uniform distribution represents **complete ignorance**.

§ **The info-gap contention:**

The probabilistic domain of discourse
does not encompass all epistemic uncertainty.

§ **We will consider common misuses of probability.**

3.1 *Keynes' Example*

§ $\rho =$ specific gravity [g/cm³] is **unknown:**

$$1 \leq \rho \leq 3$$


§

§ $\rho =$ specific gravity [g/cm^3] is **unknown**:

$$1 \leq \rho \leq 3$$


§ **Principle of indifference**:

Uniform distribution in $[1, 3]$, so:



§ Uniform distribution in $[1, 3]$, so:

$$\mathbf{Prob} \left(\frac{3}{2} \leq \rho \leq 3 \right) = \frac{3}{4}$$



§ $\phi =$ specific volume [cm^3/g] is **unknown**:

$$\frac{1}{3} \leq \phi \leq 1$$


§

§ $\phi =$ specific volume [cm^3/g] is **unknown**:

$$\frac{1}{3} \leq \phi \leq 1$$

§ **Principle of indifference**:


Uniform distribution in $[\frac{1}{3}, 1]$, so:



§ Principle of indifference:

Uniform distribution in $[\frac{1}{3}, 1]$, so:

$$\mathbf{Prob} \left(\frac{1}{3} \leq \phi \leq \frac{2}{3} \right) = \frac{1}{2}$$



§ These two events are identical:

$$\underbrace{\left(\frac{1}{3} \leq \phi \leq \frac{2}{3}\right)}_{\text{Specific volume}} \equiv \underbrace{\left(\frac{3}{2} \leq \rho \leq 3\right)}_{\text{Specific gravity}} \quad (1)$$

§

§ These two events are identical:

$$\underbrace{\left(\frac{1}{3} \leq \phi \leq \frac{2}{3}\right)}_{\text{Specific volume}} \equiv \underbrace{\left(\frac{3}{2} \leq \rho \leq 3\right)}_{\text{Specific gravity}} \quad (2)$$

§ Hence their probabilities are equal:

$$\underbrace{\mathbf{Prob}\left(\frac{1}{3} \leq \phi \leq \frac{2}{3}\right)}_{\text{Specific volume}} = \underbrace{\mathbf{Prob}\left(\frac{3}{2} \leq \rho \leq 3\right)}_{\text{Specific gravity}} \quad (3)$$

§

§ These two events are identical:

$$\underbrace{\left(\frac{1}{3} \leq \phi \leq \frac{2}{3}\right)}_{\text{Specific volume}} \equiv \underbrace{\left(\frac{3}{2} \leq \rho \leq 3\right)}_{\text{Specific gravity}} \quad (4)$$

§ Hence their probabilities are equal:

$$\underbrace{\mathbf{Prob}\left(\frac{1}{3} \leq \phi \leq \frac{2}{3}\right)}_{\text{Specific volume}} = \underbrace{\mathbf{Prob}\left(\frac{3}{2} \leq \rho \leq 3\right)}_{\text{Specific gravity}} \quad (5)$$

§ Hence:

$$\frac{1}{2} = \underbrace{\mathbf{Prob}\left(\frac{1}{3} \leq \phi \leq \frac{2}{3}\right)}_{\text{Specific volume}} = \underbrace{\mathbf{Prob}\left(\frac{3}{2} \leq \rho \leq 3\right)}_{\text{Specific gravity}} = \frac{3}{4}$$

§

§ These two events are identical:

$$\underbrace{\left(\frac{1}{3} \leq \phi \leq \frac{2}{3}\right)}_{\text{Specific volume}} \equiv \underbrace{\left(\frac{3}{2} \leq \rho \leq 3\right)}_{\text{Specific gravity}} \quad (6)$$

§ Hence their probabilities are equal:

$$\underbrace{\mathbf{Prob}\left(\frac{1}{3} \leq \phi \leq \frac{2}{3}\right)}_{\text{Specific volume}} = \underbrace{\mathbf{Prob}\left(\frac{3}{2} \leq \rho \leq 3\right)}_{\text{Specific gravity}} \quad (7)$$

§ Hence: $\frac{1}{2} = \frac{3}{4}$

$$\frac{1}{2} = \underbrace{\mathbf{Prob}\left(\frac{1}{3} \leq \phi \leq \frac{2}{3}\right)}_{\text{Specific volume}} = \underbrace{\mathbf{Prob}\left(\frac{3}{2} \leq \rho \leq 3\right)}_{\text{Specific gravity}} = \frac{3}{4}$$

§ **The Culprit:** Principle of indifference.

§

§ **These two events are identical:**

$$\underbrace{\left(\frac{1}{3} \leq \phi \leq \frac{2}{3}\right)}_{\text{Specific volume}} \equiv \underbrace{\left(\frac{3}{2} \leq \rho \leq 3\right)}_{\text{Specific gravity}} \quad (8)$$

§ **Hence their probabilities are equal:**

$$\underbrace{\mathbf{Prob}\left(\frac{1}{3} \leq \phi \leq \frac{2}{3}\right)}_{\text{Specific volume}} = \underbrace{\mathbf{Prob}\left(\frac{3}{2} \leq \rho \leq 3\right)}_{\text{Specific gravity}} \quad (9)$$

§ **Hence:** $\frac{1}{2} = \frac{3}{4}$

$$\frac{1}{2} = \underbrace{\mathbf{Prob}\left(\frac{1}{3} \leq \phi \leq \frac{2}{3}\right)}_{\text{Specific volume}} = \underbrace{\mathbf{Prob}\left(\frac{3}{2} \leq \rho \leq 3\right)}_{\text{Specific gravity}} = \frac{3}{4}$$

§ **The Culprit:** Principle of indifference.

§ Ignorance is **not probabilistic**. It's an **info-gap**.

3.2 2-Envelope Riddle

§ The riddle:

- You are presented with two envelopes.
 - Each contains a positive sum of money.
 - One contains twice the contents of the other.
- You **choose an envelope**, open it, and find \$ 50.
- **Would you like to switch envelopes?**

§ **You reason** as follows:

- Other envelope contains either \$ 25 or \$ 100.
- **Principle of indifference:**
- Assume equal probabilities.

The expected value upon switching is:

$$\text{E.V.} = \frac{1}{2} \$ 25 + \frac{1}{2} \$ 100 = \$ 62.50.$$

$$\$ 62.50 > \$ 50.$$

- Yes! **Let's switch**, you say.

§ The riddle, re-visited:

- You are presented with two envelopes.
 - Each contains a positive sum of money.
 - One contains twice the contents of the other.
- You **choose an envelope**, but do not open it.
- **Would you like to switch envelopes?**

§ You reason as follows:

- This envelope contains $\$ X > \$ 0$.
- Other envelope contains either $\$ 2X$ or $\$ \frac{1}{2}X$.
- **Principle of indifference:**
- Assume equal probabilities.

The expected value upon switching is:

$$\text{E.V.} = \frac{1}{2} \$ 2X + \frac{1}{2} \$ \frac{1}{2}X = \$ \left(1 + \frac{1}{4}\right)X > X.$$

- Yes! **Let's switch**, you say.

§ You reason as follows:

- This envelope contains $\$ X > \$ 0$.
- Other envelope contains either $\$ 2X$ or $\$ \frac{1}{2}X$.
- **Principle of indifference:**
- Assume equal probabilities.

The expected value upon switching is:

$$\text{E.V.} = \frac{1}{2} \$ 2X + \frac{1}{2} \$ \frac{1}{2}X = \$ \left(1 + \frac{1}{4}\right)X > X.$$

- Yes! **Let's switch**, you say.

§ You wanna switch again? **And again? And again?**

4 *Conclusion*

In Conclusion

§ Info-gap uncertainty:

innovation, discovery, ignorance, surprise.

§

In Conclusion

§ Info-gap uncertainty:

innovation, discovery, ignorance, surprise.

§ Info-gap uncertainty is unbounded.

§

In Conclusion

§ **Info-gap uncertainty:**

innovation, discovery, ignorance, surprise.

§ **Info-gap uncertainty is unbounded.**

§ **Optimism:** our models get better all the time.

§

In Conclusion

§ **Info-gap uncertainty:**

innovation, discovery, ignorance, surprise.

§ **Info-gap uncertainty is unbounded.**

§ **Optimism:** our models get better all the time.

§ **Realism:** our models are wrong now

(and we don't know where or how much).

§

In Conclusion

§ Info-gap uncertainty:

innovation, discovery, ignorance, surprise.

§ Info-gap uncertainty is unbounded.

§ Optimism: our models get better all the time.

§ Realism: our models are wrong now

(and we don't know where or how much).

§ Responsible decision making:

- Specify your goals.
- Maximize your robustness to uncertainty.
- Study the trade offs.
- Exploit windfall opportunities.